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THE RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT:
NEW PROTECTION FOR FINANCIAL
RECORDS
Introduction
In 1978, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Regulatory
and Interest Rate Control Act,' a sweeping bank regulatory reform
measure. This Act was intended to reform and restructure those
federal agencies which regulate depository institutions., Title XI of
this comprehensive legislation established the Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 19781 (FPA). The FPA establishes detailed proce-
dures which federal agencies and departments must comply with
when seeking access to records maintained by financial institu-
tions. These procedures require federal agencies to notify an indi-
vidual that a subpoena for the customer's financial records has
been issued prior to compliance by the financial institution. 5 The
statute grants the customer the right to challenge the subpoena
and to stay compliance until a court determination.'
This Comment will consider the concept of an individual's right
to financial privacy and how recent legislation has attempted to
safeguard this right. Part I will review the origins of the FPA. Part
II will examine the provisions of the Act. Part III will discuss vari-
ous problems encountered under the FPA and the extent of protec-
tion provided by the statute.
I. Origins of the Financial Privacy Act
A. Concern over Financial Privacy
Prior to 1970, there was little need for concern about the privacy
of financial records. Bank records were considered confidential by
bank officials and records were kept only for internal bank use.'
This practice was challenged upon the passage of the Bank Secrecy
1. Act of Nov. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641.
2. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9273.
3. 12 U.S.C. § 3400-3422 (Supp. 1978).
4. Id. § 3402.
5. Id. §§ 3405(2), 3407(2), 3408(4).
6. -d. § 3410.
7. See Note, Bank Recordkeeping and the Customer's Expectation of Confidentiality, 26
CATm. U. L. REv. 89 (1976); Palmer & Palmer, Complying with the Right to Financial Pri-
vacy Act of 1978, 96 BANKING L.J. 196 (1979).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VIII
Act of 1970.1 This legislation was designed to aid government agen-
cies in their investigations of criminal, tax, and regulatory mat-
ters.' The Bank Secrecy Act requires, inter alia, depository institu-
tions to maintain duplicate records of almost all customer
transactions. I0 In particular, it requires that checks and .other
charges in excess of $100 be microfilmed and retained for five
years." Banks have found, however, that sorting checks over $99 is
so expensive that it is easier and cheaper to microfilm all checks."2
Concomitant with this development has been an increase in per-
sonal checking accounts and an expansion of commercial banking
into the open-end credit market. 3 Commercial banks, by comply-
ing with the recordkeeping requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act,
now possess information about the activities and relationships of
millions of people. 4 As a result, the amount of financial and per-
sonal information available to the government has been commen-
surately expanded.
Improved technology has exacerbated this threat to financial pri-
vacy. For example, the use of Electronic Funds Transfer services
8. The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d,
1829b, 1951-59 (1976), 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1062, 1081-1083, 1101-1105, 1121-1122 (1976). These
sections include regulations concerning the maintenance of records by insured banks (12
U.S.C. § 1829b (1976)), by savings and loans (id. § 1730d), by noninsured financial institu-
tions (id. §§ 1951.1955), and the reporting of currency transactions (31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1122
(1976)).
9. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(a)(2) (1976).
10. Id. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959. The Bank Secrecy Act also requires depository insti-
tutions to report various types of financial transactions to the government. Id. § § 1051-1062,
1081-1083, 1101-1105, 1121-1122.
11. Id. § 1829b(d). This section contains the domestic recordkeeping provision most fre-
quently applicable to personal checking accounts at commercial banks. 31 C.F.R. § 103.31 -
.37 (1976) sets forth the recordkeeping regulations. The exemption for checks less than $100
is found at 31 C.F.R. § 103.34(b)(3), (b)(5) (1976).
12. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SCIrTM
105 (1977) thereinafter cited as PRIVACY REPORT].
13. This market involves the expanding credit-card programs of commercial banks. In
this transaction the bank is a grantor of consumer credit, an "open end" loan, the amount of
which can vary with each transaction. A record of every transaction is received by the cus-
tomer, the merchant and the bank. For a general discussion of the consumer-credit relation-
ship see PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 12, at 41.
14. Id. at 102. In our society, maintaining a bank account is practically essential for
transacting any kind of business. Justice Douglas recognized this fact when he stated: "In a
sense a person is defined by the checks he writes. By examining them the agents get to know
his doctors, lawyers, creditors, political allies, social connections, religious affiliation, educa-
tional interests, the papers and magazines he reads, and so on ad infinitum." California
Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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(EFT) promises to increase the amount of personal information
available to financial institutions. These services involve the
processing and documentation of deposits, withdrawals, and trans-
fers of money with the help of computers and telecommunica-
tions.15 One type of EFT services, point-of-sale services, allows an
individual to use funds on deposit without having to visit the
financial institution and without having to write a check."6 The de-
velopment of point-of-sale services will have several ramifications.
First, the expansion of this service will result in an increase in the
amount and detail of personal information recorded by financial
institutions as it is likely that accounting and administrative infor-
mation will accompany periodic payment. 7 Second, financial
records will become more centralized and accessible.' Third,
financial records will contain information not usually considered
payment data, such as information concerning the purpose of the
transaction."
These developments served to increase public concern over pri-
vacy during the 1970s. In addition, the Watergate investigations 0
focused attention on privacy interests by disclosing that govern-
ment officials used information from private financial records to
conduct illegitimate investigations of certain individuals. 2' Con-
15. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 12, at 113.
16. Id. at 114. Point-of-sale services can vary in sophistication. Some services permit the
simple withdrawal of funds, allowing a customer to receive cash at a store ir order to
purchase goods. A more sophisticated service allows the customer to move funds electroni-
cally from an account into the merchant's account to pay for goods or services. For a general
discussion of EFT, services and the many ramifications they will have on our financial sys-
tem, see id. at 113-19.
17. Id. at 116. The Privacy Report noted that EFT systems could become "generalized
information transfer systems." Id. For example, recurring payments could be accompanied
by related benefit and tax withholding information. Id.
18. Id. at 117. Information stored on electronic records is more accessible than informa-
tion contained in paper documentation or on microfilm.
19. Id.
20. The term "Watergate investigations" has come to mean the investigations of'illegal
activities by government officials and members of the Committee to Re-elect the President
during the administration of Richard M. Nixon. R. WOODWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, ALL THE
PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974).
21. Givens, The Law on Right to Financial Privacy, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 15, 1979, at 1, col. 2.
As concern over privacy grew, public interest in the issue of privacy increased. A recent
survey of public attitudes toward privacy showed that seventy-six percent of the people sur-
veyed felt that the right to privacy should be added to the list of the rights of life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness. Louis HARRIS & Assocs., INC. & A. WESTIN, THE DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY, A NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH SURVEY OF ArITUDEs TOWARD PRIVACY 15 (1979). The
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gress responded to this concern by enacting privacy legislation
designed to control access to information found in tax records,
credit records, and educational records." Diverse groups such as
financial institutions, civil libertarians, and consumer advocates
joined together to urge Congress to provide for the protection of
financial records of customer-depositors.23 The result of this effort
was the introduction of numerous privacy bills in Congress.24
B. Legal Rights to Financial Privacy
1. The Banker's Dilemma
Early hornbook law viewed the relationship between depositor
and bank as contractual in nature. 5 Banks were bound not to re-
veal information about a customer to private parties without the
results also showed that eighty-one percent felt that the police should not be allowed to look
into bank records of members of an organization never convicted of a crime. Id. at 69.
Ninety-one percent of the public also felt that it was "very important" for organizations
such as banks, insurance companies, private employers and credit card companies to obtain
an individual's consent before information from his file is given out to other organizations for
purposes other than what it was collected for. Id. at 90.
22. The increase in informational privacy legislation is reflected by the passage of: The
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1976), which gives consumers the right
to learn the "nature and substance" of information kept by a consumer reporting agency, id.
§ 1681g(a)(1); The Federal Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976), which controls the
gathering and dissemination of personal information by federal agencies; The Family Educa-
tional Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1976), which gives a student or a
student's parent the right to insject, review and request corrections of an educational record
and gives the student or parent some measure of control over the disclosure of information
from an educational record.
23. The Safe Banking Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 9086 Before the Subcomm. on Fi-
nancial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 House
Hearings]. Representatives of financial institutions generally supported financial privacy leg-
islation and sought a uniform standard of rules to follow which would clarify their relation-
ship to the customer and to the government. Support for such legislation also came from
groups such as the AFL-CIO, id. at 3069, the Consumer Federation of America, id. at 3091,
the American Civil Liberties Unions, id. at 1619, the National Credit Union Administration,
id. at 2085, and the American Bankers Association, id. at 1585. The 1977 House Hearings
also contain testimony from various credit union associations, banking associations, and sav-
ings and loan associations supporting financial privacy legislation.
24. "An indication of the tremendous interest in privacy is the fact that more than 100
privacy bills have been introduced during the 95th Congress. Many of these bills reflected
the recommendations of the Privacy Protection Study Commission and many covered as-
pects of financial privacy." [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9374.
25. J. WITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 17-2 at 552 (1972).
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customer's express or implied consent." A bank could be held lia-
ble for breach of this implied contract with its depositor not to dis-
close the details of the depositor's accounts." Of course, a bank
had to produce its records when faced with valid legal process."
Agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and the National Labor Relations Board
could issue an administrative summons or subpoena without prior
judicial approval?" Before the enactment of the FPA a government
agency faced with a Court challenge had only to prove that the
summons or subpoena was relevant or material to an investiga-
tion." Additional means to obtain bank records consisted of grand
26. Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 900 (1963).
27. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367'P.2d 284 (1961); see Milohnich
v. First Nat'l Bank of Miami Springs, 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969), where an
individual and a corporate depositor brought an action against the bank for alleged breach
of a contractual duty not to disclose information concerning depositors' accounts to individ-
ual third parties. The court held that the complaint was sufficient to statea cause of action
for breach by the bank of an implied contractual duty to the corporate depositor by negli-
gently, willfully, intentionally or maliciously disclosing information concerning depositors'
accounts to individual third parties. Id. at 760.
28. Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969) (involving a subpoena duces
tecum); Galbraith v. United States, 387 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1968) (involving a subpoena of
bank records).
29. There seems to be little actual difference between a subpoena and a summons. A
subpoena is defined as a process directing a witness to appear and give testimony before a
court or magistrate at a specified time and place. BLACx'S LAw DIcKONARY 1595 (4th ed.
1968). A summons is a writ which directs a sheriff or other proper officer to notify a person
named in the summons that an action has been commenced against him and that he must
appear at a specified time to answer the complaint against him. Id. at 1604. "Under code
procedure a summons is not process, but is a notice to defendant that an action against him
has been commenced and that judgment will be taken against him if he fails to answer the
complaint." Id.
30. For example, federal agencies authorized to issue administrative subpoenas and sum-
monses include: the Internal Revenue Service, I.R.C. § 7608; the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77uuu, 78u, 79r, 80a-42, 80b-9 (1976); and the National
Labor Relations Board, 29 U.S.C. §§ 161, 185, 209 (1976).
31. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964). In this case, the Court held that the
Internal Revenue Service need not meet the standard of probable cause to obtain enforce-
ment of a summons to produce records. The Commissioner need only show that
the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry
may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within the
Commissioner's possession, and that administrative steps required by the Code have
been followed-in particular, that the "Secretary or his delegate," after investiga-
tion, has determined the further examination to be necessary and has notified the
taxpayer in writing to that effect.
Id. at 57-58. In United States v. DeGrosa, 405 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1969), the court said:
It has long been established that an administrative summons authorized by Congress
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jury subpoenas and court subpoenas issued during litigation."
2. Challenging Government Requests for Information
Without a statutory right to financial privacy, depositors sought
to protect the confidentiality of their financial records by asserting
claims under the fourth amendment.3 The success of this approach
has varied. Those courts which have applied a traditional mechani-
cal property test approach to the fourth amendment have generally
held that the customer's financial records were not protected."
Under this test, a depositor must show a possessory or proprietary
interest in the financial records in order to be granted standing to
assert a claim under the fourth amendment. 5 This often proved
difficult as some courts held that the financial institution owned
the bank records." Hence, a depositor had no standing to sue. As-
suming that standing was granted, a depositor's claim on the mer-
its was often rejected because the courts viewed the bank as the
owner or possessor of the records in which the depositor had no
possessory interest. Unless the financial institution challenged a
in aid of an agency's investigative function need not be supported by ad hoc showings
of probable cause .... The Constitution only requires that the summons not be em-
ployed in excess of the statutory purpose, that it be specific in directive so that com-
pliance will not be unreasonably burdensome and that an ample opportunity be af-
forded to obtain judicial review of the demand prior to suffering penalties for a refusal
to comply.
Id. at 928-29 (citation omitted).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 45, FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a)(c).
33. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
34. See Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Bank of
Commerce, 405 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1969); Galbraith v. United States, 387 F.2d 617 (10th Cir.
1968).
35. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
36. See United States v. House, 524 F.2d 1035 (3d Cir. 1975); Galbraith v. United States,
387 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Cedrone, 400 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D.N.Y. 1975).
37. Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969).
Here the microfilm records were made and paid for by the Bank for its convenience
and business purposes. The Bank owned the microfilm. The cases hold that depositors
have no rights in the records of their bank, and that the records may be subpoenaed
over the objection of the depositor, notwithstanding the fact that the records concern
the account of the depositor.
Id., at 318; accord, United States v. Bank of Commerce, 405 F.2d 931, 934 (3d Cir. 1969);
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subpoena itself, a customer-depositor was without protection from
government intrusion into the customer's financial records. More-
over, it became virtually impossible for a bank to sue on behalf of
its customer when the Supreme Court held that a bank could not
assert its customer's expectation of privacy.38
Depositors were more successful in asserting financial privacy
claims under the fourth amendment in courts which applied a test
that focused on an individual's justifiable expectation of privacy. 9
For example, in Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino
County,4" the plaintiff, accused of grand theft, moved to suppress
certain evidence which included his bank statements." The Su-
preme Court of California held that the plaintiff had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his bank statements and records.2 The
fact that the bank voluntarily relinquished the records did not con-
stitute a valid consent by the plaintiff.43 The privacy expectations
of a depositor were expanded in Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior
Court of San Joaquin County," wherein the California Supreme
Court held that the California constitution required that a cus-
tomer receive notice that his or her records were being sought."
Generally, those cases which acknowledged the expectation of pri-
vacy did not bar all government access, but merely granted the
customer the right to notice and standing in the, absence of statute.
This position was accepted in a number of jurisdictions."
Galbraith v. United States, 387 F.2d 617, 618 (10th Cir. 1968).
38. California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 51 (1974).
39. See United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974) rev'd, 425 U.S. 435 (1976);
Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975);
Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
40. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
41. Id. at 241, 529 P.2d 591, 118 Cal. Rptr. 167.
42. Id. at 243, 529 P.2d 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. 169.
43. Id. at 244-45, 529 P.2d 594, 118 Cal. Rptr. 170.
44. 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975).
45. In considering the California Constitution, the court stated:
A constitutional amendment adopted in 1974 elevated the right of privacy to an "ina-
lienable right" expressly protected by force of constitutional mandate. Although the
amendment is new and its scope as yet is neither carefully defined nor analysed by
the courts, we may safely assume that the right of privacy extends to one's confiden-
tial financial affairs as well as to the details of one's personal life.
15 Cal. 3d at 656, 542 P.2d at 979, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
46. Bowser v. First Nat'l Bank, 390 F. Supp. 834 (D.Md. 1975) (plaintiff sought to enjoin
compliance with IRS summonses served on their banks and requiring production of docu-
ments and information pertaining to plaintiffs); Bergman v. Senate Special Comm. on Ag-
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Those decisions which favored the customer's right to financial
privacy appeared undermined by the Supreme Court's holding in
California Bankers Association v. Shultz. 7 The plaintiffs in this
case included the California Bankers Association, the Security
National Bank, several named individual bank customers, and the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of the recordkeeping requirements and the regula-
tions implemented pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act.4" The Bank-
ers Association also claimed that these requirements restricted the
depositor's ability to challenge third party summonses of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service.". The Court held that the recordkeeping pro-
visions did not violate the fourth amendment rights of the banks,50
nor were they such an unreasonable economic burden as to deny
the banks due process."' The Court implied that the banks had no
right to assert the ,claim of customers since the bank would suffer
no injury,52 although, it did not decide the issue because the claim
was found to be premature." The claims of the customer-depositors
were also found to be premature because the records of these plain-
tiffs had not yet been subpoenaed." Finally, compelled recordkeep-
ing was not found to be an illegal seizure by banks acting as gov-
ernment agents. 5 Because the government could not obtain access
to records except through "normal legal process", no seizure could
occur until such-process was issued against the bank. Therefore,
ing, 389 F. Supp. 1127 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (action to enjoin compliance with a subpoena served
on plaintiff's bank, requi.ring production of personal and corporate financial records); Sha-
piro v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 84 Misc. 2d 938, 376 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1975)
(plaintiff sought order to quash subpoena duces tecum served on plaintiff's bank and requir-
ing production of all records relating to plaintiff's corporate account).
47. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
48. Id. at 43. See notes 8-12 supra and accompanying text.
49. Id. at 51.
50. Id. at 52-54. The dissent argued that the holding presumed that every depositor is a
crook:
It is, I submit, sheer nonsense to agree with the Secretary that all bank records of
every citizen, "have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investi-
gations or proceedings." That is unadulterated nonsense unless we are to assume that
every citizen is a crook, an assumption I cannot make.
Id. at 85 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
51. Id. at 50.
52. Id. at 51.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 54.
55. Id.
[Vol. VIII
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the plaintiffs' final claim was found premature until process is-
sued.5" Implicitly, the Court's view that the records were business
records of the financial institution was antithetical to a broad view
of financial privacy.5
3. United States v. Miller
The case which sparked legislative action on financial privacy
was United States v. Miller.51 Mitchell Miller was indicted for con-
spiracy to defraud the United States of tax revenues by the manu-
facture and possession of distilled spirits." The defendent was
found guilty, in part, upon evidence obtained from his bank. Miller
challenged those provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act which required
banks to microfilm all checks, claiming that these particular provi-
sions violated a depositor's fourth amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. 0 Miller also asserted that the
subpoenas used to obtain his bank records were defective." The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Miller's challenge
to the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act had been fore-
closed by the decision in California Bankers.62 However, the court
agreed with Miller's second assertion. The court of appeals held
that the government's use of a faulty subpoena duces tecum to ob-
tain Miller's bank records was an unlawful invasion of Miller's pri-
vacy.6 1 Therefore, this evidence should have been. suppressed. 4 The
Court rested its decision on additional grounds. Citing the prohibi-
tion against "compulsory production of a man's private papers to
56. Id. at 51-52. The Court emphasized that the legislative history of the Bank Secrecy
Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder provided that access to bank records be
controlled by "normal legal process." Id. at 54.
57. Id. at 52-53.
58. 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). For a detailed discussion of
the Miller case see Alexander & Spurgeon, Privacy, Banking Records and the Supreme
Court: A Before and After Look at Miller, 10 Sw. U. L. Rxv. 13 (1978); Comment, Govern-
ment Access to Bank Records in the Aftermath of United States v. Miller and the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976, 14 Hous. L. REv. 636 (1977); Comment, No Expectation of Privacy in
Bank Records-United States v. Miller, 26 DE PAUL L. REv. 146 (1976).
59. 500 F.2d at 753.
60. Id. at 756.
61. Id. Miller urged that the subpoenas were defective because they were issued by
the U.S. Attorney rather than a court, no return was made to a court, and the subpoenas
were returnable on a date when the grand jury was not in session. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
19801
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
establish a criminal charge against him,"" the court found that the
government had improperly circumvented this doctrine by "first
requiring a third-party bank to copy all of its depositors' personal
checks and then, with an improper invocation of legal process, call-
ing upon the -bank to allow inspection and reproduction of those
copies."" The opinion stated that this doctrine had not been aban-
doned in California Bankers. In that case the majority justified its
holding, in part, with the observation that customers were ade-
quately protected from unwarranted intrusions into their financial
privacy because government access to records would be controlled
by existing legal processes. 7 Relying on this language, the court of
appeals found that the subpoenas issued in this case did not consti-
tute adequate legal process, and suppressed the evidence." Re-
jecting the mechanical property test the court held that the fact
that the bank officers cooperated voluntarily was irrelevant, be-
cause "he whose rights are threatened by the improper disclosure
here was a bank depositor, not a bank official."" Miller was
granted "a new trial free from the taint of evidence improperly
acquired."7 0
Affirmance of this decision would have established a constitu-
tional right to financial privacy under the fourth amendment. In-
stead, the Supreme Court, in a seven to two decision, reversed and
held that Miller had no legitimate "expectation of privacy" in the
contents of his bank records.7 The checks were found to be negotia-
ble instruments, voluntarily conveyed to the banks, to be used in
commercial transactions, not confidential communciations.72 The
Bank Secrecy Act did not alter these considerations so as to create
a protectable interest. In fact, "[tihe lack of any legitimate expec-
tation of privacy concerning the information kept in bank records
was assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy Act .. .
By revealing his or her financial affairs to a bank, the depositor
65. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886).
66. 500 F.2d at 757.
67. Id., citing California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 52 (1974).
68. Id. at 758.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
72. Id.
73. Id.
[Vol. VIII
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takes the risk that the information will be conveyed by the bank to
the government.74 In addition, the failure to notify Miller of the
subpoena was held to be "a neglect without legal consequences
here, however unattractive it may be."7 The Supreme Court also
found that the prohibition against "compulsory production of a
man's private papers"". had not been violated, as the documents
subpoenaed were not Miller's "private papers" and Miller could,
therefore, assert neither ownership nor possesion.77 By classifying
these documents as business records of the bank,78 the Court im-
plicitly adopted the mechanical property test approach to the ques-
tion of fourth amendment protection of financial records. The
Court stressed that its decision was consistent with United States
v. Katz.7" That case held that whatever is knowingly exposed to the
public was not protected by the fourth amendment." Therefore,
because these records were not confidential and were voluntarily
conveyed to the bank, Katz did not apply.8'
The effect of the Miller decision was to grant the government
unrestricted access to a customer-depositor's financial records
through administrative subpoenas. In response, several bills were
introduced in Congress to provide a statutory right to financial pri-
vacy. 2 Support for such legislation came from diverse groups" and
74. Id. at 443.
75. Id. at 443 n.5.
76. 116 U.S. at 622.
77. 425 U.S. at 440.
78. Id.
79. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
80. Id. at 351.
81. Id.
82. To reverse the cumulative effect of the Bank Secrecy Act and the Miller decision,
various bills were introduced in Congress and the House Subcommittee on Financial Institu-
tions conducted hearings in June and July of 1975 on H.R. 8024, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975). Bank regulatory agencies were apparently receptive to the general intent of financial
privacy bills, but the Treasury Department, responding to pressure from the IRS, was out-
spoken in its opposition. 1977 House Hearings supra note 23 at 1449. Subsequent to hearings
on these bills, the issue was studied by the House Judiciary Committee, the Sentate Bank-
ing Committee, and the Privacy Protection Study Commission. Similar bills were introduced
in subsequent sessions of Congress but the Treasury Department and law enforcement
agencies remained steadfast in their opposition. In 1977, H.R. 8133, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977) was introduced after extensive study and hearings by the House Judiciary Commit-
tee. Nine members of the subcommittee and majority of the members of the full Committee
cosponsored H.R. 8133. The provisions of H.R. 8133 were incorporated in their entirety as
title XI of H.R. 9086, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), which became the Financial Institutions
19801
608 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VIII
was bolstered by the 1976 revision of the Internal Revenue Code'4
and the report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission. 5 The
1976 revision of the Internal Revenue Code was designed to change
case law which had upheld the right of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice to issue third-party summonses to a bank requesting informa-
tion concerning tax matters of an unidentified person."6 The Tax
Reform Act of 197611 requires that the taxpayer be notified of an
IRS summons and gives the taxpayer standing to challenge the
right of the IRS to obtain the records before the bank releases
them." Thus, precedence for privacy legislation was created in the
tax area. In addition, the report of the Privacy Protection Study
Commission called for increased protection of informational pri-
vacy." The report noted that the courts had refused to "refashion
the application of constitutional theory" and abandon the tradi-
tional view that the individual lacks a "proprietary" interest in his
or her financial records and, therefore, has no legal right to chal-
lenge access to these records.'" Protection of financial privacy, the
report argued, could only come through legislation.9' Generally, the
Commission recommended that Congress provide the customer-de-
Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act. Id. A full day of hearings on the Act was
devoted to the FPA and almost every witness that testified on other parts of the bill also com-
mented on title XI.
83. See note 23, supra.
84. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1205, 90 Stat. 1525.
85. PRIVAcY REPORT, supra note 12. The Commission which wrote the report was created
by the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976), in order to make a "study of the data
banks, automatic data processing programs, and information systems of governmental, re-
gional, and private organizations, in order to determine the standards and procedures in
force for the protection of personal information." PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 12, at xv.
86. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975).
87. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455 § 1205, 90 Stat. 1525.
88. I.R.C. § 7609. Section 1205 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 amends the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code by redesignating section 7609 as section 7611 and adding, after section 7608
new sections 7609 and 7610. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1205, 90 Stat. 1525. By the time hearings
on the FPA were held, the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight had already held
hearings on the 1976 Tax Reform Act's privacy provisions and decided, over the objections of
the Departments of Justice and Treasury, that there was no reason to delay implementation
of legislation regulating the procedures and use of IRS subpoenas. 1977 House Hearings,
supra note 23, at 1451. See also notes 169-92 infra and accompanying text.
89. Compare the recommendations in chapter 9 of the Privacy Report, supra note 12,
"Government Access to Personal Records and 'Private Papers' " with the provisions of the
FPA.
90. PRIVAcY REPORT, supra note 12, at 350-51.
91. Id.
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positor with a statutory expectation of confidentiality in the cus-
tomer's financial records and that there be a reasonable relation-
ship between the records sought and the investigation." The
Commission recommended also that government agencies be re-
quired to use legal process to obtain records93 and that an individ-
ual be notified of a government request for records.9"
A final impetus for Congressional action was the enactment in
sixteen states of statutes concerning the disclosure of information
retained by financial institutions.95 The state statutes are diverse. 9
Some allow banks to share information without specifically limit-
ing disclosure, 7 while others specify conditions which must be met
before disclosure is allowed.99 However, because even the most
comprehensive state statutes did not regulate federal agencies, fed-
eral legislation was necessary to guarantee a right of financial
privacy.
II. The Financial Privacy Act
A. Introduction
In an attempt to protect the financial privacy of individuals, the
FPA prohibits any federal agency9 from obtaining access to a cus-
92. Id., Recommendation 1, at 362-63.
93. Id., Recommendation 2, at 365.
94. Id., Recommendation 3, at 371-72.
95, The states having such legislation include: Alaska: ALAS. STAT. §§ 06.05.175a-b,
.30.120 (1978); California: CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 7460-7493 (West Supp. 1978); Florida: FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 665.111(1) (West Supp. 1978); Illinois: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 161/2, § 48.1 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1977); Kansas: KA. STAT. ANN. § 9-1130 (1975); Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. §
289.271 (1970); Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 11, §§ 224-227 (West Supp. 1979); Massachu-
setts: MASS. ANN. LAWS ch' 117, § 17 (1975); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 51A.11 (West
Supp. 1979); Mississippi: MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 81-5-55, -11-5 (1972); Missouri: Mo. REV.
STAT. § 369.099 (West Supp. 1979); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 1013 (1966); Ore-
gon: ORE. REV. STAT. § 722.118 (1975); Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 6020 (West
Supp. 1979-80); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-14-1 to -5 (1953); Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. §§
215.02, .08 (West Supp. 1979-80).
96. For a general discussion of state statutes see 1977 House Hearings, supra note 23, at
1517-22.
97. UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-14-1 to -5 (1953). This statute allows banks to share with one
another and with credit reporting agencies information concerning the identity of depositors
whose accounts have been closed as unsatisfactory.
98. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 161/2, § 48.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 11, §§
224-227 (West Supp. 1979); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 7460-7493 (West Supp. 1978).
99. The term agency in this Comment will encompass all federal agencies and depart-
ments. The FPA provisions do not apply to state and local government agencies and depart-
ments.
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tomer's records from financial institutions unless one of five speci-
fied procedures is followed.""0 In addition, a blanket request for all
records is not sufficient; the records must be described as specifi-
cally as possible.' Financial institutions covered by the statute in-
clude banks, savings banks, credit card issuers, industrial loan
companies, trust companies, savings and loans, building and loans
or homestead associations, credit unions, and consumer financial
institutions.' Customers protected under the Act are individuals
or partnerships of five or less who utilize the services of a financial
institution or for whom the financial institution is acting as a
fiduciary in relation to that person's account.' 3
B. Control of Government Access to Financial Records
To obtain a customer's financial records, strict compliance with
the provisions of the FPA is required..' 4 The government may ob-
tain records by one of five procedures. The first procedure is
through customer authorization. '01 This procedure requires the cus-
tomer to sign a statement which indentifies the records to be re-
leased, specifies the purpose of the disclosure and describes those
persons who may use the records. The authorization is valid for
three months and may be revoked up to the time of actual disclo-
sure. 06 The second procedure involves the use of an administrative
subpoena or summons. 07 This procedure is available only if there is
100. 12 U.S.C.§ 3402 (Supp. 1978).
101. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9322.
102. 12 U.S.C. § 3401(1) (Supp. 1978). The statute does not cover records of credit re-
porting agencies. Instead, government access to these records is regulated by the Fair Credit
Reporting Act. [1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9307.
103. 12 U.S.C. § 3401(4), (5) (Supp. 1978).
104. Id. § 3403(a). A financial institution may voluntarily notify the government that it
has information relevant to a possible violation of the law. Id. § 3403(c). Once the govern-
ment is notified, it must still comply with the provisions of the statute if it seeks access to
financial records. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9322.
105. 12 U.S.C. § 3404(a) (Supp. 1978).
106. Id.
107. Id. § 3405. An administrative agency is a government agency created by statute and
charged with administering particular legislation. The statute which establishes the agency
may grant the agency power to issue subpoenas. The power of an administrative agency to
issue a subpoena is no longer limited to investigations of a quasi-judicial nature relating to
adjudication or law enforcement. The administrative power of investigation is not subject to
the constraints placed on the subpoena power of a court. Subpoenas may be issued "in in-
vestigations for future guidance of the agency, to determine what rules should be adopted,
• ..to determine the jurisdiction of the agency, and to determine whether a statute has
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reason to believe that the records are "relevant to a legitimate law
enforcement inquiry."'' 0 A, copy of the subpoena or summons must
be served or mailed to the customer on or before the date that it is
served on the financial institution.' 9 The customer has ten days
from the date of service, or fourteen days from the date of mailing,
to file an affidavit and motion to quash." ° The third procedure by
which the government may obtain records is through the use of
search warrants."' The warrant must be obtained pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, be mailed to the customer no
later than ninety days after it is served, and must state the reason
for searching the record."' The government may obtain a ninety
day delay in mailing if a court finds that the investigation of a
felony would be seriously jeopardized by notice."' The use of a ju-
dicial subpoena is the fourth method for obtaining access to
financial records."' The FPA provides that a judicial subpoena
may be used only if there is reason to believe the records are rele-
vant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry."' A copy of the sub-
poena, specifying the nature of the inquiry, must be served or
mailed to the customer."' The customer has ten days from service,
or fourteen days from mailing, to file an affidavit and motion to
quash."7 The final method of access is by a formal written request
by government officials." This method can be used only if no ad-
ministrative summons or subpoena authority is available to the
government official,"' the head of the agency or department has
been violated, regardless of whether there is any pre-existing probable cause." 1 AM. JUR. 2d
Administrative Law § 91 (1962).
108. 12 U.S.C. § 3405(1) (Supp. 1978).
109. Id. § 3405(2).
110. Id. § 3405(3).
111. Id. § 3406.
112. Id. § 3406(a)-(b).
113. Id. § 3406(c).
114. Id. § 3407. A judicial subpoena is one issued under the subpoena power of a court.
115. Id. § 3407(1).
116. Id. § 3407(2).
117. Id. § 3407(3).
118. Id. § 3408.
119. Congress has the power to confer investigatory or inquisitorial powers on adminis-
trative agencies. 1 AM. JUR. 2d Administrative Law § 86 (1962). Examples of agencies with
the power to issue subpoenas include the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Internal
Revenue Service and the National Labor Relations Board. Although administrative agencies
may possess implied and express investigatory powers, these powers are not unlimited but
are "exclusively derived from and limited by the authorizing statutes." Id. § 91.
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issued regulations authorizing the request, there is reason to be-
lieve the records are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement in-
quiry and the customer is served or mailed a copy of the request.'
The customer has ten days from service or fourteen days from filing
to file an affidavit and motion to quash.' The financial institution
must keep a record of all instances where the customer's records
were disclosed to government agencies.' The customer may obtain
a copy of this record unless the government agency or department
obtains a court order pursuant to the Act to suppress disclosure.'.
C. Delay of Notice to the Customer
Each of the above procedures for obtaining records requires that
notice be given to the customer. Section 3409, however, provides
for a ninety day delay of notice if the presiding judge or magistrate
of the appropriate court finds that the investigation is within the
jurisdiction of the government authority, the records are sought for
a legitimate law enforcement inquiry, and there is reason to believe
that notice will cause danger to the life or safety of someone, flight
from prosecution, destruction of evidence, intimidation of a wit-
ness, or otherwise seriously jeopardize an investigation or delay a
trial.' 4 The court may grant an additional ninety day delay but
only in accordance with this subsection. 5 The customer must be
mailed a notice specifying the reason for delay and the purpose of
the investigation or official proceeding once all delay periods have
expired.'
D. Customer Challenges to Government Access
The statute sets forth detailed procedures for challenging a gov-
ernment attempt to obtain financial records. Within ten days of
service or fourteen days of mailing, the customer may file in federal
district court a motion to quash the subpoena or summons, or an
application to enjoin a formal written request. 7 The government
120. 12 U.S.C. § 3408(4)(A)(I)-(3) (Supp. 1978).
121. Id. § 3408(4)(B).
122. Id. § 3404(c).
123. Id. Section 3409 provides for delay of notice. See notes 124-30 infra and accompany-
ing text.
124. 12 U.S.C. § 3409(a) (Supp. 1978).
•125. Id. § 3409(b)(2).
126. Id. § 3409(c).
127. Id. § 3410(a).
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must receive service of the motion, which may be accomplished by
delivering or mailing a copy of the papers to the person, office, or
department specified in the papers. 2 ' The motion must set forth
the customer's reasons for believing that the records are not rele-
vant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry or that the govern-
ment has failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the
Act. "'29 The customer is not required to prove that there is no legiti-
mate law enforcement purpose or make a detailed evidentiary
showing."3 Rather, there need only be "an initial showing that ac-
cess may be improper."'' The ultimate burden of proof that a le-
gitimate law enforcement purpose exists rests with the government
authority.'32
Should the court find the customer's filing to be sufficient, it
must order the government agency or department to file a sworn
response. A court decision on the customer challenge must be made
within seven calendar days of the government response.'33 The stat-
ute specifically states that these challenge procedures are the only
judicial remedy available to the customer if the customer wishes to
oppose disclosure of his or her financial records.'
E. Use of Information
The information obtained from the records may not be used or
retained for any purpose beyond the specific original purpose for
which it was obtained and may only be transferred to another
agency if that government authority certifies in writing that the
records are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry within
their jurisdiction.' The transferring agency must notify the cus-
tomer of the transfer within fourteen days.'36 The statute does not
128. Id. The purpose of this form of service is to give the government adequate notice,
but also to be as simple as possible. This form of service dispenses with the provisions of rule
4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which requires service on the United States Attor-
ney, the Attorney General, as well as the agency. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
9325.
129. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9325. The motion must also contain an affida-
vit or sworn statement that the applicant is a customer of the financial institution.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 12 U.S.C. 3410(b) (Supp. 1978).
134. Id. § 3410(e).
135. Id. § 3412(a).
136. Id. § 3412(b).
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prevent supervisory agencies from exchanging examination reports
or from providing information to an enforcement agency if, upon
examination of the customer records, there exists a possible viola-
tion of a regulation or statute.'37
F. Exceptions
There are several exceptions to the provisions of the FPA. These
exceptions include: disclosure of information not identified as the
financial records of a particular customer; examination of records
by supervisory agencies in the exercise of their supervisory, regula-
tory or monetary functions with respect to the financial institution;
disclosures authorized under the Tax Reform Act of 1976; informa-
tion required by federal statute or regulation; disclosure of records
where the government and customer are parties to litigation or
when they are are parties to an administrative adjudicatory pro-
ceeding; when the government seeks only the name, address, ac-
count number and type of account, or when the government is ex-
ercising financial controls over a foreign account in the United
States; when the financial institution itself is under investigation;
and finally, grand jury subpoenas. 3 ' The Securities and Exchange
Commission is exempted from title XI for two years from the date
of enactment.3 9 There are also special procedures when foreign in-
telligence, the Secret Service, or emergency situations are
involved. 110
G. Costs
The costs of retrieval and reproduction of bank records can be
quite high.' The FPA places the cost burden on the government
by requiring the government authority to reimburse financial insti-
137. Id. § 3412(d).
138. Id. § 3413.
139. Id. § 3422. An exception was made for the SEC, "in recognition of its rigorous inter-
nal procedures, and of the credible threat that agency's objections to the title would have
posed if the exception had not been granted." [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9376.
140. Id. § 3414. Congress seems to have meant that this exception be used only for legiti-
mate foreign intelligence investigations: "investigations proceeding only under the rubric of
'national security' do not qualify." [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9327.
141. Interview with Jon Karnofsky, European American Bank, in New York City (Oct.
19, 1979). See note 209 infra. Therefore the costs depend on the scope of the subpoena and
the number of records it requests. '
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tutions for collecting and supplying the requested information.'
Pursuant to this requirement, the Federal Reserve Board recently
adopted Regulation S,113 which became effective October 1, 1979.
The Regulation requires a government authority, subject to the
FPA, requiring or requesting access to financial records, to pay a
fee to financial institutions of ten dollars per hour per person for
search and processing costs,' fifteen cents per page for reproduc-
tion costs,'45 and actual costs for transporation of personnel and
records. 4 ' The government is not required to reimburse the
financial institution if a request involves any government authority
or customer-depositor not covered by the FPA.47 In addition, Regu-
lation S excepts certain requests from the reimbursement require-
ments.'48 Financial institutions are required to keep an accurate re-
cord of costs by each request, including an itemized bill of various
costs. "'49 The requesting government authority must certify in writ-
ing that it has complied with the provisions of the statute. 50 After
the financial institution has received a "Certificate of Compli-
ance," it can submit an itemized bill to the government for repay-
ment. Should a certificate not be received because the request was
withdrawn, the customer revoked authorization or the customer
successfully challenged disclosure to the federal agency, the
142. 12 U.S.C. § 3415 (Supp. 1978). This section requires that the Federal Reserve Board
adopt a new regulation that provides rates and conditions for reimbursement of reasonably
necessary costs "directly incurred in searching for, reproducing or transporting books, pa-
pers, records, or other data required or requested to be produced."
143. 12 C.F.R. § 219 (1979).
144. Id. § 219.3(a). This is for the total amount of personnel direct time used in locating,
retrieving, reproducing, packaging and preparing financial records for shipment.
145. Id. § 219.3(b). This expense is designated to cover costs incurred in making copies of
documents. Photographs, films and other materials are reimbursed at actual costs.
146. Id. § 219.3(c). These costs include the financial institution's necessary costs to
transport personnel to locate and retrieve information required or requested and to convey
the material to the place of examination.
147. See 12 U.S.C. § 3415(a) (Supp. 1978).
148. Id. § 219.4. These exceptions include information concerning security interests,
bankruptcy claims, debt collection, government loan programs, nonidentifiable information,
financial supervisory agencies, Internal Revenue summonses, federally required reports, gov-
ernment civil or criminal litigation, administrative agency subpoenas, identity of accounts in
limited circumstances, investigation of a financial institution or its noncustomers, General
Accounting Office requests, and Securities and Exchange Commission requests. Id. §
219.4(a)-(1).
149. Id. § 219 (supplementary information).
150. 12 U.S.C. § 3403(b) (Supp. 1978).
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financial institution can submit the itemized bill for costs up to the
time the federal agency notifies the financial institution that its
request has been withdrawn or defeated. 5'
H. Jurisdiction and the Statute of Limitations
Jurisdiction over actions to enforce any provision of the FPA
rests with the United States district courts. There is a three year
statute of limitations for actions brought under the Act.'52
I. Civil Penalties
The FPA imposes civil penalties for unauthorized disclosures in
the amount of $100 for each violation.'53 In addition, the FPA pro-
vides for actual damages, punitive damages and attorney's fees. 54
These remedies and sanctions are the only remedies available for
violations of the FPA. 55 However, injunctive relief is available to
insure compliance with provisions of the FPA.56
J. Grand Jury Information
The Act contains special provisions concerning information ob-
tained by a federal grand jury. The information sought for grand
jury use must be actually presented to the grand jury and used
only for the purposes of indictment and prosecution.'57 The infor-
mation obtained must be destroyed or returned to the financial in-
stitution if it is not used for these purposes.'58 The information used
by the grand jury must be maintained only in the sealed records of
the grand jury unless it is used as evidence of the crime for which
151. 12 C.F.R. § 219 (1979). It should be noted that there are exceptions to the Certifi-
cate requirement, i.e., financial institutions will not receive one when financial records are
sought by a financial supervisory agency (12 U.S.C. § 3413(b) (Supp. 1978)); for federal
litigation (id. § 3413(e)); for agency adjudicative proceedings (id. § 3413(f)); pursuant to a
grand jury subpoena or court order (id. § 3413(i)); and by the Secret Service or for foreign
intelligence activities (id. § 3414(a)).
152. 12 U.S.C. § 3416 (Supp. 1978). Section 3419 provides for a toll of the statute of
limitations if a customer challenges access to financial records.
153. Id. § 3417 (a)(1).
154. Id. § 3417(a)(2)-(4).
155. Id. § 3417(d).
156. Id. § 3418. The statute does not define injunctive relief. It is clear, however, that in
order to insure effective compliance with the statute, a preliminary injuction should be is-
sued prior to the seizure of financial records. See note 192 supra and accompanying text.
157. Id. § 3420(1), (2).
158. Id. § 3420(3).
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the grand jury issued the indictment. 5 '
III. Potential Problems under the FPA
Although the FPA has been in effect only since March 10, 1979,
concern has already arisen over the scope of protection afforded by
the Act and the potential problems customers may encounter when
using the customer challenge provisions.
A. Scope of the Financial Privacy Act
The scope of the FPA is specifically limited to requests from fed-
eral agencies and departments. 6 " Suggestions that state agencies
be included within the scope of the Act were rejected by Con-
gress.' 1 This limitation will curtail the effectiveness of the statute
to the extent that local demands proliferate. In addition, the
financial burden of complying with these demands falls upon the
financial institution as demands from any state agency or from any
agency exempted under the Act work to deny the reimbursement
provisions.' 2 Short of legislation which includes within the scope of
the Act state agencies, an unlikely occurrence, state legislation is
necessary to ensure that interests in financial privacy are
protected.
Several states have recently enacted legislation that establishes
requirements that must be met before financial records may be dis-
closed pursuant to valid legal process." 3 The California Right to
Financial Privacy Act"4 is the most comprehensive state legislation
enacted thus far. This statute requires that prior to the disclosure
159. Id. § 3420(3), (4).
160. Id. § 3401(3).
161. This may have been due to the Supreme Court decision in National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In any event, the limitation was deliberate and Congressional
intent clear:
This limitation reflects our belief that legislation affecting state and local government
is the proper province of the respective state governments and of the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State laws. We believe that grave constitutional and polit-
ical issues would have been raised if this title had applied to other levels of
Government.
Congress went on to add that state enactment of financial privacy statutes should be en-
couraged. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9376.
162. See note 147 supra and accompanying text.
163. For example, Illinois, Maryland and California have enacted this type of legislation.
See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
164. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7460-7493. (West Supp. 1977).
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of a customer's financial records, the government must comply
with the procedural formalities of compulsory process or receive
customer authorization. 6 ' The customer must receive notice of any
compulsory process issued by the state.' The statute also grants
standing under state constitutional law to quash a subpoena issued
by a state agency.'67 Notwithstanding the benefits of state legisla-
tion, the difference in state laws, which invariably result, may be
burdensome to the customer, financial institutions and government
alike. '6
B. The Financial Privacy Act and the Internal Revenue
Service
Requests for financial records by the Service are exempt from the
FPA65 because the Tax Reform Act of 1976 had already enacted
new provisions controlling such requests. 7 ' It is uncertain, however,
whether reliance on these provisions is justified.
Prior to the 1976 Tax Reform Act, a taxpayer had no standing to
intervene in third party summonses 7' enforcement proceedings.'
New procedures for third party summonses are now established
under section 7609 of the Internal Revenue Code. This section re-
quires the Service to- give the taxpayer notice of the third party
summons within three days of service.' The notice must include a
165. Id. § 7470.
166. Id. § 7474, 7476(a)(1), (b)(1)(i).
167. Id. 33 7474(a)(3), 7476(a)(2), (b)(1)(i). A California court recently held that the con-
stitutional right to privacy was violated by section 7474 of the California Right to Financial
Privacy Act. This section was found to be impermissibly overbroad because it authorized
state agencies to obtain financial records pursuant to an administrative subpoena without
any showing of materiality or probable cause. Rietz v. California Camino Bank, 90 Cal. App.
3d 139, 154 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1979).
168. Interview with Albert DeLeon, National Bank of North America, in New York City
(Oct. 16, 1979).
169. 12 U.S.C. § 3413(c) (Supp. 1978).
170. See notes 84-88 supra and accompanying text.
171. A third party summons is a summons issued to a party other than the one being
investigated. For example, it would include a summons issued to a bank for the records of a
customer-depositor.
172. See note 176 infra and accompanying text. For a general discussion of IRS sum-
monses see Comment, Government Access to Bank Records in the Aftermath of United
States v. Miller and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 14 Hous. L. REv. 636 (1977); Comment,
IRS Access to Bank Records: Proposed Modifications in Administrative Subpoena Proce-
dure, 28 HASTINGs L. J. 247 (1976).
173. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(1).
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copy of the summons and directions for staying compliance.'74 The
taxpayer has fourteen days to notify the financial institution not to
comply.'75 The financial institution will not release the records if it
receives notice from its customer not to comply. Should the tax-
payer give such notice, the Service must seek enforcement under
section 7604 in federal district court.'76 The taxpayer is automati-
cally entitled to intervene in any enforcement proceedings under
section 7604 and may assert any defenses available.'77 In order to
prevent this section from being used for purposes of delay only, the
section suspends the statute of limitations, both civil and criminal,
while the IRS is seeking enforcement of the summons.'78
The Tax Reform Act also seeks to control the use of "John Doe"
summonses by Service agents. A John Doe summons is one which
requests information concerning tax matters of an unidentified per-
son pursuant to section 7602.11 The Supreme Court upheld the
right of the IRS to issue these types of summonses,8 0 but the Inter-
nal Revenue Code now requires that the Service obtain judicial ap-
174. Id.
175. Id. § 7609(d)(1).
176. Id. § 7609(d)(2). A summons is not self-enforcing. Under section 7604, if a sum-
moned party refuses to produce the material that has been requested, the I.R.S. must bring
an enforcement action in federal district court.
177. Id. § 7609(b)(1). For a general discussion of defenses see Comment, Government
Access to Bank Records in the Aftermath of United States v. Miller and the Tax Reform Act
of 1976, 14 Hous. L. REV. 636, 655 (1977).
178. I.R.C. § 7609(e).
179. 'The IRS has the power to issue summonses for the production of records, books and
papers, and for the taking of testimony. Section 7602 provides:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return
where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal
revenue tax . . . the Secretary is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or
material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of
books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax
or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary may deem proper, to
appear before the Secretary at a time and place named in the summons and to pro-
duce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under
oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant
or material to such inquiry.
Id. § 7602.
180. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975).
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proval of the summons prior to service."'
These new procedures provide the taxpayer with notice and
standing. Notably lacking in the Tax Code's provisions is a prohi-
bition of informal access'82 to third party records. Informal access
to bank records seems to have been infrequent in the past because
of the frequent and easy use of the pocket summons.'83 However,
informal access may now increase because the statute strictly regu-
lates the issuance of third party summonses.'84 In addition, a cus-
tomer is unable to stay compliance should the financial institution
accede to an informal request by the Service or if the Service fails
to give the customer notice as required under section 7609. The
financial institution will release the records to the Service if it
hears nothing from the customer within fourteen days of receipt of
the summons. Moreover, because the Code does not provide for
penalties where notice is not given, a citizen is without any means
to enforce these newly granted rights. Thus, there exists a serious
shortcoming in the Internal Revenue Code provisions and, in turn,
in the FPA because of the IRS exemption it contains.
One solution available to the courts is the exclusion from evi-
dence of financial records obtained without compliance with sec-
tion 7609.11 ' In one case where notice was not given, the court held
181. I.R.C. § 7609(f). In order to get court approval, it must be established that the
summons is relevant to an investigation, there is reasonable belief that there may be a viola-
tion of the internal revenue law and that the information is not readily available elsewhere.
182. Informal access would involve government access to records without the benefit of a
search warrant, administrative summons or grand jury subpoena. An agent could simply rely
on personal friendship with bank officials and ask for information about a particular cus-
tomer-depositor.
183. This is a summons issued pursuant to section 7602 of the Code and can be used for
the production of books, papers, records and for the taking of testimony. These summonses
do not require prior judicial approval, in fact, any IRS agent may issue one. If a bank official
refuses to give an agent the information he requests, the agent can pull a blank summons
from his pocket and write in the name of the customer and a general description of the
records he wants. See Comment, Government Access to Bank Records in the Aftermath of
United States v. Miller and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 14 Hous. L. REv. 636, 651-52
(1977)._
184. Interview with Jeremiah Gutman, Levy, Gutman, Goldberg & Kaplan, in New York
City (Oct. 17, 1979). Informal access may be more likely to occur in small financial institu-
tions rather than large ones because in the large institutions violation of procedures set forth
in procedure manuals can result in the discharge of the employee. Interview with Peter
Gray, Citibank, in New York City (Oct. 19, 1979). See also Comment, Government Access to
Bank Records in the Aftermath of United States v. Miller and the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
14 Hous. L. REV. 636, 656-57 (1977).
185. The exclusionary rule was first established in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
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that the taxpayer was not entitled to notice and a hearing prior to
enforcement of the summons." 6 The court reasoned that because
the events took place before section 7609 became effective, Miller
controlled.'87 Thus, the taxpayer had no protectable liberty or prop-
erty interest in his financial records.'88 This decision should not
now be followed because section 7609 has, in effect, given the tax-
payer a protectable property interest. Tax cases involving the pro-
priety of IRS requests for financial records support this position.'89
To obtain financial records for an investigation, the IRS must show
that "the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate
purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the
information sought is not already within the Commissioner's pos-
session, and that the administrative steps required by the Code
have been followed ... ."110 In one case a federal circuit court held
that where these standards are not met and it is shown that the
records are for a strictly criminal investigation, the exclusionary
rule should be applied and the financial records should be sup-
pressed. 9' If the courts exclude evidence when the IRS has an im-
proper purpose in obtaining it, they should also exclude it if the
procedural requirements of the Financial Privacy Act are not fol-
lowed. The use of the exclusionary rule will effectively insure com-
pliance with the new provisions. 9 '
(1914).
186. United States v. Schutterle, 586 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1978). This court cited the
Miller decision in support of its holding that the taxpayer had no property interest, and thus
none of the protections of procedural due process in the "business records of the bank." Id.
at 1204-05.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. United States v. Chemical Bank, 593 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Schutterle, 586 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 572
F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Hori, 470 F. Supp. 1209 (C.D. Cal. 1979); United
States v. Bank of Stockton, 467 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Cal. 1979); United States v. Key Oil, 460
F. Supp. 878 (D.N.J. 1978).
190. United States v. LaSalle, 437 U.S. 298, 313-14 (1978) (quoting United States v.
Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964)).
191. United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1978). The court remanded the case
to the district court for a factual determination whether the proper procedures had been
followed.
192. This sanction is consistent with the purpose of the exclusionary rule as formulated
in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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C. Difficulty of the Customer Challenge
The statute requires that the government show a "legitimate law
enforcement inquiry" to obtain financial records.'93 The statute de-
fines this standard as "a lawful investigation or official proceeding
inquiring into a violation, of or failure to comply with, any criminal
or civil statute or any regulation, rule, or order issued pursuant
thereto."'94 This appears to give the government a fair amount of
latitude in obtaining records. Apparently, Congress meant to im-
pose a lower standard than "probable cause" believing that the
combination of "reason to believe" and "legitimate law enforce-
ment inquiry" will sufficiently prevent an unwarranted intrusion
by an agency into an individual's financial records.'95 However, the
customer notification of the summons only describes generally the
nature of the inquiry. The lack of information concerning the inves-
tigation provided for in the notice coupled with the short amount
of time9 ' in which a challenge must be made may make it difficult
to rebut the government's position. The customer need not make a
detailed evidentiary showing as the ultimate burden of proof rests
on the government.'97 For example, the customer may claim that to
the best of his or her belief he or she has no connection with the
investigation, has committed no offense in relation to the investiga-
tion, or the request for records is merely harassment in view of
prior unsuccessful government attempts to obtain financial
records.' The customer may also try to show that the government
is actually checking on his or her lifestyle and that there is no true
police investigation.'99 In addition, if the financial records of an or-
ganization are being requested, the organization may claim that
the government merely wants a membership list of the
organization .200
193. 12 U.S.C. § 3407(1) (Supp. 1978).
194. Id. § 3401(7) (Supp. 1978).
195. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9323.
196. 12 U.S.C. § 3410(a) (Supp. 1978). The customer only has ten days from service or
fourteen days from the mailing of a subpoena, summons or formal written request to contest.
See notes 110, 117 & 122 supra.
197. See notes 129-32 supra and accompanying text.
198. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9325-26.
199. Interview with Jeremiah Gutman, Levy, Gutman, Goldberg & Kaplan, in New York
City (Oct. 17, 1979).
200. Id. This would probably violate NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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Some attorneys feel that the customer's burden is not very diffi-
cult to meet, that the customer has a chance to win in court and
that the requirements of the challenge provisions offer the customer
sufficient protection.2 ' However, it is apparent that should the cus-
tomer try to attack the purpose of the inquiry directly, the agency
can simply reply that the purpose of the inquiry is to determine
whether that type of transaction took place. The customer may
have a very difficult time negating this because the government
must only meet a standard of "legitimate law enforcement in-
quiry."2 °2 Any attempt to prove that the agency request is discrimi-
natory would also be difficult to prove0 3 as this attack will fail if
the agency can show that the investigation is broader than the al-
leged classification. Finally, it will probably be extremely difficult
for the customer to obtain agency records to prove this point. 04
Thus, it appears that even a customer who understands the notice
received and acts in a timely fashion to oppose the request will face
formidable difficulties in challenging any agency request.0 5
D. Omissions in the Financial Privacy Act
Corporations and partnerships with more than five persons are
not covered by the FPA. 0 These entities, however, are usually pro-
vided with notice of government requests for their records by their
financial institution and are usually well aware of any legal pro-
ceedings concerning them.0 7 Therefore, this exemption will rarely
201. Interview with Jeremiah Gutman, Levy, Gutman, Goldberg & Kaplan, in New York
City (Oct. 17, 1979).
202. Givens, The Law on Right to Financial Privacy, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 15, 1979 at 2, col. 2.
203. Id. at 3, col. 1. An agency may be discriminatory in its selection of customers it
wishes to investigate, basing its selection on political, religious or ethnic grounds.
204. Id.
205. Another problem for the customer may arise if the financial institution gives special
treatment to favored customers. If the financial institution receives a demand for records
and hears nothing within the ten to fourteen day period, it can release the records. The
records are not always released immediately, thus the potential exists for financial institu-
tions to release records of favored customers more slowly in order to give them more time to
act on the request. Interview with Jeremiah Gutman, Levy, Gutman, Goldberg & Kaplan, in
New York City (Oct. 17, 1979).
206. 12 U.S.C. § 3401(4) (Supp. 1978).
207. Interview with Albert DeLeon, National Bank of North America, in New York City
(Oct. 16, 1979); Interview with William Dolan, Chase Manhattan Bank, in New York City
(Oct. 17, 1979); Interview with Jeremiah Gutman, Levy, Gutman, Goldberg & Kaplan, in
New York City (Oct. 17, 1979); Interview with Susan Pollack, Citibank, in New York City
(Oct. 19, 1979); Interview with Peter Gray, Citibank, in New York City (Oct. 19, 1979);
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pose a problem for them. However, requests for corporate records
are usually detailed and comprehensive and thus are costly to pro-
duce. °0 The financial institution, therefore, may be burdened by
this omission in the Act's scope.
Other exemptions to the FPA will also cause problems. One ex-
emption, grand jury subpoenas, is a potential source of abuse. Gov-
ernment agents can go to an Assistant United States Attorney on
their own and obtain a grand jury subpoena."' In this instance,
they need not comply with FPA regulations because they are not
getting the subpoena through their own agency.210 Even if the gen-
eral practice of the financial institution affords the customer notice
of any subpoena,2" the customer will not have standing to quash
the subpoena.' In addition, the financial institution is not reim-
bursed for its costs.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exemption (un-
til November, 1980)213 poses similar problems. SEC subpoenas are
often lengthy and detailed.1 The financial institution will not be
reimbursed, Additionally, customers will receive no notice and will
not have standing to quash until November, 1980. Significantly,
most SEC subpoenas are for financial records of corporate ac-
counts."5 Therefore, the elimination of this exclusion will be of lit-
tle consequence so long as corporations remain outside the scope of
the Act.
Presently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is not covered by
the FPA. However, this exemption will be eliminated by the char-
Interview with Jon Karnofsky, European American Bank, in New York City (Oct. 19, 1979);
Interview with Jay Soloway, Chemical Bank, in New York City (Oct. 23, 1979).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 12 U.S.C. § 3420 (Supp. 1978).
211. See interviews cited in note 207 supra.
212. In this situation, the common law rule of Miller would control. The customer would
have no right to financial privacy under the fourth amendment and therefore would have no
standing to contest the subpoena.
213. See note 139 supra.
214. Interview with Albert DeLeon, National Bank of North America, in New York City
(Oct. 16, 1979); Interview with William Dolan, Chase Manhattan Bank, in New York City
(Oct. 17, 1979); Interview with Jon Karnofsky, European American Bank, in New York City
(Oct. 19, 1979); Interview with Jay Soloway, Chemical Bank, in New York City (Oct. 23,
1979).
215. See note 214 supra.
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ter proposals presently before Congress.2"' These proposals would
give the FBI authority to issue "investigative demands."2 '7 These
investigative demands, like administrative subpoenas, will allow
the FBI to obtain from third-party recordkeepers financial records
in a manner similar to that provided for under the FPA. To deter
abuse, the proposals contain notice and challenge provisions in ad-
dition to other provisions similar to the FPA.1'
Finally, a problem may arise from the transfer of financial
records between agencies or between levels of government. The cus-
tomer is entitled to notice of a transfer of financial records from
one federal agency to another and may challenge such transfer. ' 9
However, no notice is required to be given to the customer or the
financial institution if the records are passed from a federal agency
to a local agency.
E. Costs
Costs for financial institutions have been an ongoing problem
under the FPA. Originally, the statute required financial institu-
tions to notify all of their customers of their rights under the
FPA.220 A study done by Citibank showed that this requirement
would cost all affected institutions $922 million, based on the esti-
mate that notices would have to be mailed to 967.8 million ac-
counts.22 ' However, this section was repealed before the FPA be-
came effective.222
Costs still pose a heavy burden on financial institutions because
the reimbursement schedule under Regulation S is often insuffi-
cient to cover their search, reproduction, and transfer costs. Repro-
duction costs are apparently much higher than fifteen cents per
216. 33 CONSUMER FINANCE L. BULL. 128 (Sept. 7, 1979). The charter proposals are H.R.
5030 (Rodino, D-N.J.) and S. 1612 (Kennedy, D-Mass.).
217. Id. These charter proposals cover third-party recordkeepers such as banks, insur-
ance companies and other creditors. The proposals include notice and challenge provisions,
provisions for delay of notice and similar exceptions to those found in the FPA.
218. Id.
219. 12 U.S.C. § 3412(b) (Supp. 1978).
220. Id. § 3404(d).
221. Seitel, Congress Seen Favoring Change in Financial Privacy Act, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20,
1979, at 1, col. 2.
222. 12 U.S.C. § 3040(d) was repealed. Act of Mar. 7, 1979, Pub. L. No.' 96-3, § 1, 93
Stat. 5.
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page"' and the research requirements often exceed ten dollars per
hour.2 4
IV. Conclusion
There has been virtually no immediate change in banking proce-
dures as a result of the FPA. Many banks had already operated
pursuant to a general policy of giving customers notice whenever
the bank received any type of legal process, unless they received a
court order not to give notice." The financial institution has sim-
ply become a conduit and the onus of protection now falls on the
government and the customer.
The statute has not yet been interpreted or applied by the
courts. One recent case, United States v. Grubb,2" decided after
the FPA became effective, but the facts of which occurred prior to
the Act's effective date, presented virtually the same facts as did
United States v. Miller."' In Grubb, the court used the same tradi-
tional fourth amendment analysis applied in Miller and held that
the bank customer had no protectable fourth amendment interest
in his bank records. 28 Notably, the court stated that "[h]ad the
subpoena for defendant Grubb's bank records been issued after
March 15, 1979, the United States Attorney and the Agent could
not have behaved as they did in this case."2 The court, however,
refused to give the FPA retroactive effect. It is apparent that the
FPA has reversed the holding of Miller.
The court in Grubb raised another interesting point that will
223. Although photocopying only runs four cents to eight and one-half cents per page,
microfilm reproduction costs sixty cents per page and most records are on microfilm. Inter-
view with Jon Karnofsky, European American Bank, in New York City (Oct. 19, 1979).
224. Interveiw with Peter Gray, Citibank, in New York City (Oct. 19, 1979). It was noted
that research requires supervisory personnel to insure compliance with all provisions of the
FPA and the cost of such personnel often runs higher than $10.00 per hour.
225. See interviews cited in note 207 supra. The only change which might occur will be
with banks which, in the past, have placed a service charge on accounts in order to cover
costs incurred when faced with legal process. This process may have to be stopped now
that Regulation S is in effect. Interview with William Dolan, Chase Manhattan Bank, in
New York City (Oct. 17, 1979).
226. 469 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
227. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
228. The conduct of the government agent, who told bank employees not to notify the
customer of the subpoena, was characterized by the court as "overzealous" but was not
found to be a violation of the customer's constitutional rights. 469 F. Supp. 991, 995 (E.D.
Pa. 1979).
229. Id.
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eventually require judicial interpretation. The defense motion to
suppress the evidence consisting of Grubb's bank records was de-
nied because the actions had taken place before the effective date
of the statute. The court questioned, however, whether it could
have suppressed the evidence even if the actions had occurred after
the effective date. Section 3417 of the FPA provides for civil penal-
ties for violations of the FPA and states that "[tihe remedies and
sanctions described in this title shall be the only authorized judi-
cial remedies and sanctions for violations of this title."' 0 Because
section 3417 does not provide for the exclusion of evidence obtained
in violation of the FPA, the court questioned whether it could have
used this remedy even if the FPA had been in effect."' For reasons
discussed earlier in this Comment,2 2 courts should exclude evi-
dence that is obtained in violation of the statute in addition to
awarding the customer damages as provided for in the Act. 3
Thus far the FPA does not seem to have hindered law enforce-
ment activities. Under both the new Internal Revenue Code provi-
sions and the FPA there have been very few customer challenges.2'
The courts have not been inundated with litigation as was pre-
dicted. This may be due to several reasons: the customer may feel
that the challenge provisions are too difficult to meet and the bur-
den of proof is too high; the customer may be unaware of the
import of the notice received when the subpoena or summons is
served; or the expense of good legal advice may simply be too high
for the customer to pursue the matter. Despite these practical
difficulties, the FPA affords consumers necessary protection by
preventing access to financial records without prior notice and an
opportunity to challenge requests for such records in court.
Lorena Kern Davitt
230. 12 U.S.C. § 3417(d) (Supp. 1978).
231. United States v. Grubb, 469 F. Supp. 991, 995 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
232. See notes 191-92 supra and accompaning text.
233. 12 U.S.C. § 3417 (Supp. 1978). The Act awards the customer $100 plus actual and
punitive damages.
234. See interviews cited in note 207 supra.
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